

An introduction to secure, scalable wireless LAN deployment

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Contents

- Wireless network security
- IEEE 802.1X
- Conclusions

Wireless LANs are unsafe

```

Network List (Autofit)
Name          T M Ch Packts Flags IP Range
! <stealthy>  A Y 01  9615      0,0,0,0

Info
Ntwrks      1
Pckets     9615
Cryptd     8996
Weak        1
Noise       0
Discrd      0
Pkts/s     376
Elapsd    000104

Status

Found SSID "stealthy" for cloaked network BSSID 00:02:2D:27:D9:22
Connected to Kismet server version 2.8.1 build 20030126205324 on localhost:2
Battery: AC 100% 0h0m0s

```

```

root@ibook:~# tcpdump -n -i eth1
19:52:08.995104 10.0.1.2 > 10.0.1.1: icmp: echo request
19:52:08.996412 10.0.1.1 > 10.0.1.2: icmp: echo reply
19:52:08.997961 10.0.1.2 > 10.0.1.1: icmp: echo request
19:52:08.999220 10.0.1.1 > 10.0.1.2: icmp: echo reply
19:52:09.000581 10.0.1.2 > 10.0.1.1: icmp: echo request
19:52:09.003162 10.0.1.1 > 10.0.1.2: icmp: echo reply ^C

```

```

ifconfig eth1 hw ether
00:00:de:ad:be:ef

```

The screenshot shows the Kismet GUI with a menu bar (File, Edit, Settings, Help) and a table of scan results. The table has columns for C, BSSID, Name, WEP, Last IV, Chan, Packets, Encrypted, Interesting, PW: Hex, and PW: ASCII. A single entry is visible for BSSID 00:02:2D:27:D9:22, Name 'stealthy', WEP 'Y', Last IV 'D8:4A:1D', Chan '1', Packets '3430654', Encrypted '3379593', Interesting '2294', PW: Hex '74:38:24:47:63', and PW: ASCII 't8\$Gc'. Below the table are 'Start', 'Stop', and 'Clear' buttons.

Requirements

- Identify users uniquely at the edge of the network
 - Prevent session hijacking
- Scalable
- Easy to deploy and use
- Open

- Give away for next part: allow for guest use

Possible solutions

Standard solutions provided by AP's:


- Open access: scalable, not secure
- MAC-address: not scalable, not secure
- WEP: not scalable, not secure

Alternative solutions:

- Web-gateway+RADIUS
- VPN-gateway

- 802.1X+RADIUS

Access to the campus WLAN



- Initial connection is either to a trusted or an untrusted network

Open network + web gateway (a.k.a. „web-redirect hotspots“)

- Open (limited) network, gateway between (W)LAN and the rest of the network intercepts all traffic (session intercept)
- Can use a RADIUS backend to verify user credentials
- Guest use easy
- Browser necessary for initial login
- Hard to maintain accountability
 - Session hijacking

Why isn't Web-Redirect good enough?

- Commercial hotspots almost exclusively use this method
- Why don't we?
 - no packet encryption on link, easily sniffable
 - user can't verify operator
 - operator doesn't care about lost/sniffed credentials as long as he gets his subscription money
- => Web-Redirect is perfect for a commercial operator
- but we should try to do better!

Open network + VPN Gateway

- Open (limited) network, client must authenticate on a VPN-concentrator to get to rest of the network
- Client software needed
- Proprietary and/or tough to setup
- Hard to scale
- VPN-concentrators are expensive
- Guest use hard (sometimes VPN in VPN)
- All traffic encrypted
- NB: VPN's **are** the method of choice for protecting data on a WAN

IEEE 802.1X

- True port based access solution (Layer 2) between client and AP/switch
- Several available authentication-mechanisms through the use of EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
- Standardised
- Also encrypts all data, using dynamic keys
- RADIUS back-end:
 - Scalable
 - Re-use existing trust relationships
- Easy integration with dynamic VLAN assignment (802.1Q)
- Client software necessary (OS-built in or third-party)
- Future proof (WPA, WPA2/802.11i)
- For **wireless** and **wired**


Summary

- SOHO security options of AP's don't work
- Web-redirect+RADIUS: scalable, not secure
- VPN-based: not scalable, secure
- 802.1X: scalable, secure


802.1X

802.1X/EAP


- Authenticated/Unauthenticated Port
- Supplicant/Authenticator/Authentication Server
- Uses EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
- Allows authentication based on user credentials




EAP over LAN (EAPoL)



Through the protocol stack



Secure access to the campus LAN with 802.1X




user@someuniversity.xy
pass: weirdpasswd

- 802.1X
- (VLAN assignment)

→ signaling
— data

securing the authentication payload

- Common protocols within EAP:
 - EAP-TLS: both supplicant and server validate their identity with certificates
 - EAP-TTLS: server presents certificate, establishes TLS tunnel → supplicant uses username+password
 - PEAP-MSCHAPv2: similar to EAP-TTLS, but additionally encrypts username+password
- These protocols provide mutual authentication



Conclusions

Summary

- There is a difference between providing access to campus resources over the Internet and providing network access
- Access via the Internet: VPN
- Network access: **802.1X**
- Next: How 802.1X can be leveraged for guest access